Abstract: Theory-testing occupies a central place within social science, but what kinds of evidence count toward a meaningful test of a causal proposition? We offer two analytic results that have important implications for the relative merits of observational and experimental inquiry. The first result addresses the optimal weight that should be assigned to unbiased experimental research and potentially biased observational research.
Introduction
Empirical studies of cause and effect in social science may be divided into two broad categories, experimental and observational. In the former, individuals or groups are randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions. Most experimental research takes place in a laboratory environment and involves student participants, but several noteworthy studies have been conducted in real-world settings, such as schools (Howell and Peterson 2002) , police precincts (Sherman and Rogin 1995) , public housing projects (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001) , and voting wards (Gerber and Green 2000) . The experimental category also encompasses research that examines the consequences of randomization performed by administrative agencies, such as the military draft (Angrist 1990 ), gambling lotteries (Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote 2001) , random assignment of judges to cases (Berube 2002) , and random audits of tax returns (Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001) . The aim of experimental research is to examine the effects of random variation in one or more independent variables.
Observational research, too, examines the effects of variation in a set of independent variables, but this variation is not generated through randomization procedures. In observational studies, the data generation process by which the independent variables arise is unknown to the researcher. To estimate the parameters that govern cause and effect, the analyst of observational data must make several strong assumptions about the statistical relationship between observed and unobserved causes of the dependent variable (Achen 1986; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) . To the extent that these assumptions are unwarranted, parameter estimates will be biased. Thus, observational research involves two types of uncertainty, the statistical uncertainty given a particular set of modeling assumptions and the theoretical uncertainty about which modeling assumptions are correct.
The principal difference between experimental and observational research is the use of randomization procedures. Obviously, random assignment alone does not guarantee that an experiment will produce unbiased estimates of causal parameters (cf. Cook and Campbell 1979, chp. 2, on threats to internal validity). Nor does observational analysis preclude unbiased causal inference. The point is that the risk of bias is typically much greater for observational research. This essay characterizes experiments as unbiased and observational studies potentially biased, but the analytic results we derive generalize readily to situations in which both are potentially biased.
The vigorous debate between proponents of observational and experimental analysis (Cook and Payne 2002; Heckman and Smith 1995; Green and Gerber 2003; Weiss 2002 ) raises two meta-analytic questions. First, under what conditions and to what extent should we update our prior beliefs based on experimental and observational findings? Second, looking to the future, how should researchers working within a given substantive area allocate resources to each type of research, given the costs of each type of data collection?
Although these questions have been the subject of extensive discussion, they have not been addressed within a rigorous analytic framework. As a result, many core issues remain unresolved. For example, is the choice between experimental and observational research fundamentally static, or does the relative attractiveness of experimentation change depending on the amount of observational research that has accumulated to that point in time? To what extent and in what ways is the trade-off between experimental and observational research affected by developments in "theory" and in "methodology"?
The analytic results presented in this paper reveal that the choice between experimental and observational research is fundamentally dynamic. The weight accorded to new evidence depends upon what methodological inquiry reveals about the biases associated with an estimation procedure as well as what theory asserts about the biases associated with our extrapolations from the particularities of any given study. We show that the more one knows ex ante about the biases of a given research approach, the more weight one accords the results that emerge from it. Indeed, the analytics presented below may be read as an attempt to characterize the role of theory and methodology within an observational empirical research program. When researchers lack prior information about the biases associated with observational research, they will assign observational findings zero weight and will never allocate future resources to it. In this situation, learning is possible only through unbiased empirical methods, methodological investigation, or theoretical insight. These analytic results thus invite social scientists to launch a new line of empirical inquiry designed to assess the direction and magnitude of research biases that arise in statistical inference and extrapolation to other settings.
Assumptions and Notation
Suppose you seek to estimate the causal parameter M. To do so, you launch two You now embark upon an experimental study. Before you examine the data, the central limit theorem leads you to believe that your estimator, X e , will be normally distributed. Given that M = m (the true effect turns out to equal m) and that random assignment of observations to treatment and control conditions renders your experiment unbiased, X e is normal with mean m and variance σ 2 Xe . As a result of the study, you will observe a draw from the distribution of X e , the actual experimental value x e . In addition to conducting an experiment, you also gather observational data. Xo . In other words, the observational study produces an estimate (x o ) that may be biased in the event that b is not equal to 0. Bias may arise from any number of sources, such as unobserved heterogeneity, errors-in-variables, data-mining, and other well-known problems. The variance of the observational study (σ 2 Xo ) is a function of sample size, the predictive accuracy of the model, and other features of the statistical analysis used to generate the estimates.
Finally, we assume that given M = m and B = b, the random variables X e and X o are independent. This assumption follows from the fact that the experimental and observational results do not influence each other in any way. In sum, our model of the research process assumes (1) normal and independently distributed priors about the true effect and the bias of observational research and (2) normal and independently distributed sampling distributions for the estimates generated by the experimental and observational studies. We now examine the implications of this analytic framework.
The Joint Posterior Distribution of M and B
The first issue to be addressed is how our beliefs about the causal parameter M will change once we see the results of the experimental and observational studies. The more fruitful the research program, the more our posterior beliefs will differ from our prior beliefs. New data might give us a different posterior belief about the location of M, or it might confirm our prior belief and reduce the variance (uncertainty) of these beliefs.
Let f X (x) represent the normal probability density for random variable X evaluated at the point x, and let f X|A (x) be the conditional density for X evaluated at the point x given that the event A occurred. Given the assumptions above, the joint density associated with the compound event M = m, X e = x e , B = b, and X o = x o is given by
What we want is the joint posterior distribution of M, the true effect, and B, the bias associated with the observational study, given the experimental and observational data.
Applying Bayes' rule we obtain:
Integrating over the normal probability distributions (cf. Box and Tiao 1973) (Box and Tiao 1973) . In this instance, the biased observational estimate is re-centered to an unbiased estimate by subtracting off the prior expectation of the bias. It should be noted that such re-centering is rarely, if ever, done i practice. Those who report observational results seldom disclose their priors about the bias term, let alone correct for it. In effect, researchers working with observation routinely, if implicitly, assert that the bias equals zero and that the uncertainty associated with this bias is also zero.
To get a feel for what the posterior distribution implies substantively, it is useful to consider several limiting cases. If prior to examining the data one were certain that the true effect were µ, then σ The standard errors associated with regression estimates, for example, are calculated based on the unstated but often implausible assumption that the bias associated with a given estimator is known with perfect certainty before the estimates are generated. These standard errors would look much larger were they to take into account the value of σ measur ent techniques, statistical methodology, and the like. The experimental study of face-to-face canvassing randomly assigns citizens t treatment and control groups. Canvassers contact citizens in the treatment group ent dates back to Eldersveld (1956) and currently enjoys something of a revival in political science (Gerber and Green 2000).
2 As Gerber and Green (2000) explain, complications arise in this type of experiment when canvassing campaigns fail to make contact with those subjects assigned to the treatment group. This problem may be addressed statistically using instrumental variables regression, although as Heckman and Smith (1995) note, the external validity of this correction requires the assumption that the canvassing has the same effect on those who could be reached as it would have had among those the canvassing campaign failed to contact. This assumption may be tested by randomly varying the intensity of the canvassing effort. Below, we take up the question of how our conclusions change as we take into account the potential for bias in experimental research.
Suppose for the sake of illustration that your prior beliefs about M, the effect of canvassing on voter turnout, were centered at 10 with a variance of 25 (or, equivalently, a andard deviation of 5). These priors imply that you assign a probability of about . Notice that although the observational study has much less sampling variability than the experimental study, it is accorded much less weight. Indeed, the experimental study has ur times as much influence on the posterior mean as the observational study. The hat is fo observational study, corrected for bias, raises the posterior estimate of M, while the prior lowers it, resulting in a posterior estimate of 11.9, which is very close to the experimental result. The prior variance of 25 has become a posterior variance of 5.6, a reduction t attributable primarily to the experimental evidence. Had the observational study contained 1,000,000 observations instead of 10,000, thereby decreasing its standard error from 1 to .1, the posterior variance would have dropped imperceptibly from 5.61 to 5.59, and the posterior mean would have changed only from 11.85 to 11.86. A massive investment in additional observational data produces negligible returns.
One interesting feature of this example is that the experimental and observa results are substantively rather similar; both suggest that canvassing "wo 
, allocate n e = R/π e and n o = 0. estimates were derived statistically. In the example mentioned above, a canvassing experiment was conducted in a given city at a given point in time. Door-to-door canvassing was conducted by certain precinct workers using a certain type of getvote appeal. Voter turnout rates were calculated based on a particular source of information. Finally, the statistical results were generated by models that make certa assumptions about the rate at which canvassers actually made contact with subjec treatment group and the amount of influence that treatment subjects may have had on control subjects. Extrapolating to other times, places, and modes of canvassing introduces the possibility of bias.
A straightforward extension of the present analytic framework could be made t cases in which experiments are potentially biased. Delete the expressions related readily from a laboratory setting, "even a tiny randomized experiment may be better than a large uncontrolled experiment" (1986, p.7). Our point is not that laboratory experiments are inherently flawed; rather, the external validity of laboratory studies is a empirical question, one that has been assessed extensively in medicine and scarcely at in political science.
All things being equal, the external validity of field experimentation exceeds that of laboratory experimentation. However, the advantages of field experimentation in terms of external valid iz note that the integrity of random assignment is sometimes compromised by those charged with administering treatments, who deliberately or unwittingly divert a treatm to those who seem most deserving. They note also the complications that arise when people assigned to the control group take it upon themselves to obtain the treatment fro sources outside the experiment. To this list may be added other sources of bias, such as problems of spillover that occur when a treatment directed to a treatment group affects a nearby control group or the experimenter's failure to measure variations in the treatme that is actually administered. When treatments are shunted to those who were assigned to the control group, for example, the original random assignment provides a valid instrumental variable predicting which individuals in the treatment and control groups actually received the treatment. Despite the fact that some members of the control group we treated inadvertently, consistent parameter estimates may be obtained through instrumental variables regression so long as the assigned treatment group was more to receive the treatment than the assigned control group (Angrist, Imbens, and Rub 1996) .
4
Although statistical correctives are often sufficient to mend the problems that afflict field experiments, certain potential biases can only be addressed by adjusting th experimental design. For exam subset of families that apply for them. This design arguably renders a conservative estimate of the effects of vouchers, inasmuch as the competitive threat of a private voucher program gives public schools in the area an incentive to work harder, thereby narrowing the performance gap between the treatment group that attends priva schools and the control group that remains in public school. 5 In order to evalua 4 The interpretation of these estimates is straightforward if one assumes (as researchers working with observational data often do) that the treatment's effects are the same for all members of the population. Strictly speaking, the instrumental variables regression y. the ted interventions, which affected only a small percentage of the total student-age population.
provides an estimate of the effect of the treatment on those in the treatment group who were treated (or, in the case of contamination of the control group, those treated at different rates in the treatment and control groups). Note, however, that the issue of heterogeneous treatment effects is relevant for the issue of external, not internal, validit Whether bias creeps into an extrapolation to some other population depends on how correspondence between those treated in the experiment and those who would be trea in some other setting. 5 The magnitude of this bias is likely to be small in the case of the Howell and Peterson systemic effects of vouchers, it would be useful to perform random assignment at the level of the school district rather than at the level of the individual. In this way, the analyst could ascertain whether the availability of vouchers improves academic performance in public schools. This result would provide extrinsic evidence about th bias associated with randomization at the individual level.
Field experiments of this sort are of course expensiv procedures the bias associated with a given observational study could be identified more precisely (lowering σ 2 B ), the weight assigned to those observational findings would go up. Social scientists have accumulated enormous amounts of data, but like ancient texts composed in some inscrutable language, these data await the discovery of insights that will enable them to become informative.
Unfortunately, the ex ante prediction of bias in the estimation of treatment effects has yet to emerge as an empirical research program in the social sciences. To be sure, methodological inquiry into the properties of statistical estimators abounds in the social sciences. Yet, we know of no study that assesses the degree to which methodological experts can anticipate the direction and magnitude of biases simply by inspecting the ution of observational social science research. 6 The Notice that the foregoing example makes use of substantive assumptions in or to bolster the credibility of a causal inference. In this case, we stipulate the absence other plausible explanations for the observed increase in popularity ratings. Were able to do this routinely in the analysis of observational data, the problems of inference would not be so daunting. Lest one wonder why humans were abl u that physical experimentation requires no explicit control group when the range of alternative explanations is so small. Those who strike flint and steel together to make fi may reasonably reject the null hypothesis of spontaneous combustion. When estimatin the effects of flint and steel from a sequence of events culminating in fire, σ 2 B is fairly small; but in those instances where the causal inference problem is more uncertain because the range of competing explanations is larger, this observational approach breaks down. Pre-experimental scientists had enormous difficulty gauging the efficacy of medical interventions because the risk of biased inference is so much greater, given the many factors that plausibly affect health outcomes.
This analytic framework leaves us with an important research principle: In t of mean-squared error, it may be better to study fewer observations, if those observations are chosen ways that minimize bias. To see this principle at work, look back at our observations, 1200 of which were free from bias. If we harbor uninformative priors about the bias in the observational component of the dataset, the optimal weighting of ese observations involves placing zero weight on the 10,000 bias-prone observations s to nt ctors that affect the dependent variable. For example, if imminent municipal elections but still gs to ure empirical research. The point extends beyond the problem of case selection and internal th and focusing exclusively on the 1200 experimental observations. The implication for large-N studies of international relations, comparative politics, or public opinion is that is may be better to focus on a narrow but uncontaminated portion of a larger dataset.
How can one identify the unbiased component of a larger dataset? One way i generate the data through unbiased procedures, such as random assignment. Another is to look for naturally occurring instances where similar cases are confronted with differe stimuli, as when defendants are assigned by lot to judges with varying levels of punitiveness. More tenuous but still defensible may be instances where the processes by which the independent variable are generated have no plausible link to unobserved fa cause local officials to put more police on the streets, and if the timing of municipal elections across a variety of jurisdictions has no plausible relationship to trends in crime rates, the municipal election cycle can be used as an instrumental variable by which to estimate the effects of policing on crime rates (Levitt 1997) . More tenuous still, arguably more defensible than a blind canvass of all available cases, is an attempt to match observations on as many criteria as possible prior to the occurrence of an intervention. For certain applications, this is best done by means of a panel study in which observations are tracked before and after they each encounter an intervention, preferably an intervention that occurs at different points in time. These methods are not free from bias, but the care with which the comparisons are crafted reduces some of the uncertainty about bias, which makes the results more persuasive.
The Value of Theory. The more theoretical knowledge the researcher brin bear when developing criteria for comparability, the smaller the σ 2 B and the more sec the causal inference. Thus, in addition to charting a new research program for methodologists, our analysis calls attention to an under-appreciated role of theory in validity. Any causal generalization, even one based on a randomized study that takes place in a representative sample of field sites, relies to some degree on extrapolation.
very experiment has its own set of idiosyncrasies, and we impose theoretical The framework laid out here cannot adjudicate the issue of how a discipline should allocate its resources to research questions of varying substantive merit, but it does clarify the conditions under which a given research program is likely to make progress. Our ability to draw causal inferences from data depends on our prior knowledge about the biases of our procedures. The implication of this proof is that one cannot squeeze additional information o observational research by comparing initial observational estimates to experimental estimates, calibrating the bias of the observational stud b e es as simply aggregating all of the observational and experimental evidenc using the estimation methods described in the text.
